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Abstract 
Understanding the determinants and consequences of changes in household size and 
structure is important to a wide range of social, economic, and environmental issues.  In 
the U.S., living arrangements have undergone tremendous changes over the past 200+ 
years, but have been relatively stable since 1980.  What drove these changes, and 
whether the recent stability can be expected to continue, are critical questions.  While 
research has identified demographic events that drive particular types of changes in 
households, a systematic understanding of past and potential future changes is lacking.  
We use a household projection model to assess the sensitivity of household size and 
structure to various demographic events, and show that outcomes are most sensitive to 
changes in fertility rates and union formation and dissolution rates.  They are less 
sensitive to the timing of marriage and childbearing and to changes in life expectancy.  
We then construct a set of future scenarios designed to reflect a wide but plausible range 
of outcomes, including a new set of scenarios for union formation and dissolution rates 
based on past trends, experience in other countries, and current theory.  We find that the 
percentage of people living in households headed by the elderly may climb from 11% in 
2000 to 20-31% in 2050 and 20-39% in 2100, while the average size of households 
could plausibly be as low as 2.0 or as high as 3.1 by the second half of the century. 
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Leiwen Jiang  
Brian C. O’Neill 
Background 
Household size and composition have changed tremendously since the establishment of 
the United States, a result of a continuous process of household fission and decline in 
the importance of the family (Kobrin 1976; Ermisch and Overton 1985). Progression 
through the traditional family life cycle has become less common as people remain 
unmarried for longer, cohabitation and union dissolution have become easier and more 
acceptable, and the remarriage rate has declined. These social changes are reflected in 
large changes in demographic measures of household characteristics.  The average 
household size has more than halved since 1790, dropping from 5.8 persons per 
household to 2.67 in 2000. The proportion of households with just one person increased 
from 3.7 percent in 1790 to 13 percent in 1960 and further to 26 percent in 2000. And 
non-family households which consist primarily of people who live alone or share 
housing with non-relatives have been on the rise. 
While the change in household composition was a continuous process, it 
accelerated after 1960. In 1960, 85 percent of households were family households; this 
figure dropped to 69 percent by 2000. Two-parent family households with children 
declined from 44 percent to 24 percent of all households between 1960 and 2000. Over 
the same period, unmarried-couple households increased from less than 1 percent to 
about 5 percent of total households and have become progressively more likely to 
include children.  The number of single-parent (particularly single-mother) households 
increased from 1.5 million in 1950 to 9.5 million in 2000 (Bianchi and Casper 2000).   
Most of the changes in household formation and dissolution during this period 
happened before the early 1980s. Trends since the 1980s suggest a slowing or even in 
some cases cessation of changes in household living arrangements: very little change in 
the proportion of two-parent or single-mother household, stabilized living arrangements 
for young adults and the elderly, a slowing growth in divorce and cohabitation, and an 
almost unchanged average household size during the 1990s.  It is unclear whether this 
recent stability indicates a new sustained equilibrium, or is just a temporary lull 
(Bianchi and Casper 2000).  
Here we develop a set of projections of future living arrangements to explore 
this question.  Anticipating changes in the number, size, and composition of households 
is an important element of many issues of social concern. For example, the living 
arrangements of the elderly are a key determinant of their needs for socio-economic, 
physical and emotional assistance.  Older persons who live alone are more likely to be 
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in poverty than older persons who live with their spouses (Dalaker 1999) and have 
greater needs for healthcare. Projections of household growth and its composition by 
size are also crucial inputs to the development of housing policy for many states and 
local governments (Holmberg 1987; King 1999; Muller et al. 1999; Canada Depository 
Service Program 1996; Scottish Executive 2000). In addition, much research stresses 
the importance of household characteristics, especially those linked to household life 
cycle stages, to understanding savings and consumption patterns. These patterns have 
important implications not only for welfare at the household level, but may also have 
substantial macro-economic effects (Deaton and Paxson 2000; Tsai et al. 2000; Gokhale 
et al. 1996).  Household type and size are also important determinants of the mix of 
consumption across different types of goods (Wilkes, 1995).  
Furthermore, there is a growing appreciation that shifts in distributions of 
households by type and size, through their effects on consumption patterns, can have 
important environmental consequences (O’Neill et al. 2001).  Recent work links 
changing living arrangements to effects on biodiversity (Liu et al. 2003), land use (Perz 
2001; MacCracken et al. 1999; Van Diepen 1995), carbon dioxide emissions (Dalton et 
al. 2006), household energy use (O’Neill and Chen 2002; Jiang 1999; MacKeller et al. 
1995), transportation (Fuernkranz-Prskawetz et al. 2001; Carlsson-Kanyama and Linden 
1999; Select Committee 1998), and water (Jiang 1999; Martin 1999).  This emerging 
line of work is moving beyond the approach typical in the past of treating population 
size as the only relevant demographic variable when considering environmental impact. 
In the past three decades, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of 
studies have been devoted to investigating the demographic determinants of past 
household changes in the US (Burch 1970; Burch and Mathews 1987; Carliner 1975; 
Ermisch and Overton 1985; Kobrin 1973, 1976; Richards, White and Tsui 1987; Santi 
1987, 1988; Sweet 1984; Teachmen 1982; Watkins, Menken and Bongaarts 1987; 
White and Tsui 1986).  While each is informative, taken as a group they are incomplete: 
most focus only on the determinants of a certain household type (e.g. family 
households, single-mother households, or elderly households), or on the influence of 
one demographic event (e.g., mortality or fertility). Conclusions have not always been 
clear since demographic events can have complex effects on household types.  For 
example, the effect of immigration is complicated by a variety of patterns of residence 
upon arrival to the U.S. (Hunton 1998) and of changes after arrival as economic and 
social situations change (Burr and Mutchler 1993).  The effects of fertility and mortality 
on household size have been shown to vary over time as underlying demographic 
conditions change (Kobrin 1976). In some cases studies have even been contradictory.  
For example, Burch (1970) concluded that under all family systems (nuclear, stem and 
extended family), life expectancy is positively correlated with average household size. 
On the other hand, Kobrin (1976) maintains that mortality decline increases the 
importance of one- and two-person households and therefore contributes to a fall in 
household size.  
Simulation is an alternative approach, but although a number of household 
simulation models have been developed over the past three decades, we are not aware of 
any systematic study of the influence of demographic factors on household changes.  
Several studies  have reviewed the changes in household headship and its determinants 
in the US, but either related those changes to general socioeconomic (rather than 
demographic) conditions (Carliner 1975), or decomposed the separate influences of 
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changing population structure and overall propensity of household formation  (Kobrin 
1973; Sweet 1984). Such studies cannot identify how specific demographic events lead 
to particular changes in household composition.  A recent effort by Zeng et al (2003), 
using the extended household projection model ProFamy, developed three scenarios of 
future household change for the U.S. Assumptions about future fertility, mortality, and 
migration were adopted from the US Census Bureau 2000 population projection, and, in 
the absence of available scenarios for rates of union formation/dissolution, arbitrary 
assumptions were adopted. 
In this study we use ProFamy to (1) carry out a thorough sensitivity analysis of 
future living arrangements to various demographic events; and (2) construct a set of 
scenarios intended to span a wide but plausible range of outcomes for composition of 
the population by household age structure and size.  The second goal requires the 
development of scenarios not only for familiar components of change in a population 
projection (fertility, mortality, and migration) but also for factors affecting household 
formation and dissolution such as divorce, cohabitation, age at leaving home and age at 
marriage, and propensity of the elderly to live with children.  Here the literature is 
sparse and we break new ground in justifying our scenarios based on past trends and 
theoretical reasoning. 
In section 2 we briefly describe the household projection model and the data 
used.  Section 3 describes the sensitivity analysis, and section 4 develops the input 
assumptions for our set of scenarios.  Section 5 discusses the results of our household 
scenarios, and a concluding discussion is provided in section 6. 
Data and methodology 
We adopt the macro-dynamic household projection model ProFamy developed by Zeng 
and his collaborators (Zeng, Vaupel and Wang 1997, 1998).  Zeng extended 
Bongaarts’s nuclear status life table model (Bongaarts 1987) into a general family 
household simulation macro model that includes both nuclear and three-generation 
family households (Zeng 1986, 1988, 1991). It was further extended and developed into 
a two-sex dynamic model, known as ProFamy, that permits demographic schedules to 
change over time and requires only the conventional data sources of survey data, vital 
statistics and census data (Zeng, Vaupel and Wang 1997, 1998). Projections are 
performed based on status transition rates, and then distributions of households by size 
and type are derived based on characteristics of reference persons (or household 
‘markers’) in a manner that produces consistent projections of households and 
individuals. Individuals in the projected population are classified according to 8 
dimensions of demographic status: age, sex, marital status, parity, number of children 
living at home, co-residence with parents, private or collective household, and races.   
The ProFamy approach is attractive in that it allows for direct specification of 
demographic rates, requires data only from conventional sources, and produces a wealth 
of detailed output on projected household types. It has been used to make population 
and household projections for China (Zeng, Wang, Jiang and Gu submitted) and two 
regions of China (Jiang 1999), Austria (Prskawetz, Jiang and O'Neill 2004), Germany 
(Hullen 2003), and the U.S. (Zeng et al. 2003).  
Projections require base-year population and household type data, as well as 
estimations of current summary measures and standard schedules, which we adopt from 
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Zeng et al. (2003). We develop our own scenarios of future summary measures of 
fertility, mortality, union formation and dissolution, migration, leaving parental home, 
and mean ages of leaving parental home, marriage and giving births.  The model 
distinguishes four races (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic and others) 
although in this study we assume that summary measures change by the same 
proportion across all race categories.  
Sensitivity analysis  
We carry out a sensitivity analysis by comparing a benchmark projection, in which all 
summary measures and standard schedules for demographic rates are held constant over 
the 21st century, to scenarios in which individual summary measures (and some 
combinations of measures) are changed.  Based on the studies discussed in section 1, we 
investigate the effects of the measures expected to be most important to household 
outcomes: total fertility rate, life expectancy, number of migrants, the general rate1 and 
mean age at union formation and dissolution, general rate and mean age at leaving 
parental home, and the proportion of elderly with adult children who co-reside with 
them. While impacts on a wide range of household characteristics could be studied, we 
focus on changes in population composition by household size and age of the 
householder (hereafter referred to as “household age”) and on selected household types. 
Note that the composition of the population by household age is different from the 
population age structure, since composition by household age reflects not only 
population age structure but also the age composition of households. 
To ensure at least numerical comparability across the different scenarios in the 
sensitivity analysis, in each case we perturb one or more variable relative to the 
benchmark case in identical ways: we specify a linear increase/decrease by 25% by 
2050, and then a constant value thereafter.  In contrast, the benchmark scenario assumes 
that all parameters remain constant over the entire century at their 2000 levels. 
 
Figure 1a Sensitive analysis on the impacts of demographic events on
household size composition
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 Figure 1b Percentage differences of average household size of
changes in demographic events relative to the constant scenario
-3.0
0.0
3.0
6.0
9.0
12.0
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
LE +25%
TFR +25%
NM +25%
UF +25% & UD -25%
GM&CR +25%
GD&CDR -25%
M&Bage +25%
LWC +25%
 
Note: 1.Constant: no change to any summary measures;  
+25% or -25%: a 25% of increase or decrease of the demographic parameters by year 2050, and 
remain at that level afterwards;  
LE: life expectancy;  
NM: net migrants;  
UF & UD: union formation and union dissolution;  
GM&CR: general marriage rate and general cohabitation rate;  
GD&CDR: general divorce rate and general cohabitation rate;  
M&Bage: mean age at first marriage and mean age at all births;  
Mage: mean age at first marriage;  
Bage: mean age at all births;  
LWC: propensity of living with children by the elderly who has adult child. 
 
Results for average household size (Figure 1a) show that in all cases, average 
size is expected to decline for 20-30 years before beginning to rise.  This decline 
represents a break from the past 20 years of relatively stable size, and occurs even in the 
benchmark scenario in which there is no change in any of the demographic variables.  A 
decomposition analysis (details available from the authors) shows that 60% of the 
decrease of average household size in the period of 2000-2030 is due to shifts in 
population age structure while 40% is due to changes in household headship rates.  
Headship rates change due to the momentum of the demographic events affecting the 
process of household formation and dissolution (Zeng et al., 2003).  Baby boomers 
experienced dramatic changes in demographic behaviour from the 1960s to early 1980s: 
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low level of and postponed marriage, rapid increase in the divorce rate, low fertility rate 
and late childbearing, and early and high propensity of leaving parental home. The 
effect of these changes on household size and structure persist as households pass 
through the life cycle, even after demographic rates stabilized in the late 1980s and the 
1990s. 
The parameter with the largest effect on household size is TFR: increasing TFR 
from about 2.0 in 2000 to 2.5 in 2050 increases the average household size relative to 
the benchmark case by 6% by 2050 and 11.5% by 2100 (Figure 1b). The difference in 
household size continues to increase even after TFR stabilizes in 2050 because (1) it 
takes about 35 more years for the entire childbearing population to have experienced the 
highest fertility rate, and (2) the echo effects of the larger cohorts born during the 2000-
2050 will continue to influence the composition of population by household type 
(including size) in future decades.  
The second largest effect is caused by general union formation and dissolution 
rates.  Increasing the general marriage and cohabitation rates (or decreasing the general 
divorce and cohabitation dissolution rates) by 25% leads to about a 3% increase in 
household size relative to the benchmark case by 2050, with the effect remaining 
constant thereafter.   The two effects are not precisely additive.  When both changes are 
introduced simultaneously – representing the case of more pervasive and stable unions – 
the effect on average household size is somewhat smaller than would be obtained by 
adding together the results of the separate sensitivity analyses.  This result serves as a 
caution regarding the interactions between demographic events affecting household 
formation. 
We also analyzed separately the effect of changes in marriage and cohabitation, 
finding that changes in marriage rates produces more significant changes in average 
household size than changes in cohabitation rates. The reason is that while increases in 
the two rates generate similar changes in the proportion of couple households, increased 
marriage leads to a higher proportion of one-couple households with children, since 
married couples have higher fertility than cohabiting couples.  
The effects of changes in other factors are smaller.  Increasing life expectancy 
by 25% leads to only a 1% smaller average household size relative to the benchmark 
case in 2050.  Increasing life expectancy increases the size of elderly households as 
more spouses live longer, but also increases the proportion of the population living in 
households headed by the elderly, a category whose household size is still small relative 
to the rest of the population.   
Increasing the propensity of the elderly to live with adult children, or increasing 
the number of net migrants, both increase the average household size by about 1% by 
2050.  The immigration result is probably an underestimate in that we assume 
immigrants have the same reproductive (and other demographic) behaviour as the native 
born population, when in fact there is evidence that immigrants have a higher chance of 
living in large households and tend to have higher fertility than the native born (Burr 
and Mutchler 1993; Hunton 1998).  
We also test the effects of changes in the timing of demographic events.  
Increasing the average age at first marriage and average age of all births by 25% 
generates larger households (relative to the benchmark case) until 2060, and smaller 
households thereafter.  Scenarios not shown in the figures indicate that the independent 
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effect of increasing age at marriage is always to drive down average household size. 
Postponement of marriage means more people living in small non-family households 
for longer. The fluctuation in the comparative household size is exclusively caused by 
the change in age at childbearing.  Increasing the mean age at childbearing by shifting 
the period fertility schedule (as is done here) increases the fertility of women in older 
childbearing years, while decreasing the fertility of women in younger childbearing 
years.  The net period effect on births depends on the age structure.  In the U.S. during 
the period 2000-2030, this structure favors increased births and therefore has a positive 
effect on household size.  Later, age structure favors fewer births and exerts a negative 
effect on average size.  
Results for composition by household age (Figure 2) are more straightforward.  
Those variables that have a strong effect on population age structure – fertility and life 
expectancy – also have a substantial effect on composition by household age.  Variables 
such as union formation and dissolution, age at leaving home, and proportion of elderly 
living with adult children do not affect the population age structure, but can affect 
composition by household age.  However the magnitude of these effects is relatively 
small.  For example, union formation/dissolution affects composition by household age 
to the extent that there are age differences between cohabiting or married couples, but 
these age differences are small.  The scenarios testing sensitivity to age at leaving home 
and living with children show that these variables affect composition by household age 
much less than fertility or mortality. 
 
 
Figure 2 Relative differences of proportion of population living in
households by age of householder (constant=1)
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We also examine the effect of these demographic rates on household types of 
particular significance: one-person, couple-only, couple with children, and single parent 
with children (Appendix Table 1). In the constant scenario, one person and couple-only 
households increase as a proportion of the population during the middle of the century, 
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then decrease back to close to their original levels, while households consisting of 
couples with children do the reverse (decrease temporarily before returning to original 
levels).  These effects are due to population and household momentum, as discussed 
above.  Single parent with children households increase throughout the century in the 
constant scenario, while three generation households fall and remain well below original 
levels. The trends for one person and couple-only households are most sensitive to 
union formation and dissolution rates, particularly marriage and cohabitation, which 
leads to a strong decrease in the population living in single person households and an 
increase in couple households, relative to the constant scenario.  Similarly, increasing 
TFR leads to a strong decrease in couple households and a strong increase in households 
consisting of couples with children, relative to the constant scenario.  Single parent 
households are most affected either by fertility (increasing fertility leads to increases in 
the proportion living in these households) or by union formation/dissolution (more 
stable unions leads to a decrease in this household type).  Three generation households 
are most sensitive to the timing of marriage and births, with delays leading to a 
reduction in the population living in this household type. 
Scenarios for demographic events 
To quantify a plausible range of household projection outcomes for the U.S., we 
develop three scenarios: a mid-range projection and two projections intended to span a 
wide but plausible range of outcomes in two of our primary characteristics of interest: 
composition by household age and household size. Based on the sensitivity analysis in 
the previous section, we define our scenarios in terms of alternative assumptions about 
future trends in TFR, the general rates of marriage and cohabitation formation and 
dissolution, life expectancy at birth, and number of net migrants, with particular 
attention paid to TFR and union formation/dissolution. We do not include changes in 
age at childbearing since it does not act in a single direction on household size, and 
therefore is less amenable to bounding scenarios. We don’t include changes in the 
proportion of elderly living with adult child, or changes in the age at marriage, since 
they have only a weak effect on both household size and population composition by 
household age.  The case for not considering changes in age at marriage or birth is also 
strengthened by the fact that the 25% changes used in the sensitivity analysis are very 
large in absolute terms, and therefore even an extreme scenario is likely to have a much 
smaller effect even than those shown in the previous section. 
In general one pair of scenarios cannot be expected to bound outcomes for more 
than one variable; e.g., given a set of high and low assumption for fertility, mortality, 
and migration, the combination producing bounds for population size will not produce 
bounds for age structure (Lee, 1999).  However in this case, bounds for average 
household size and for population composition by household age can both be created 
with the same set of input assumptions.  The assumptions leading to large households – 
high fertility, low life expectancy, high migration, increased union formation and 
decreased union dissolution – are also the assumptions that lead to a young composition 
by household age.  Our full scenario set therefore consists of large/young, medium, and 
small/old scenarios. 
The rest of this section briefly describes the basis for our specification of 
alternative scenarios for inputs.  In the case of TFR, life expectancy, and net migration, 
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our approach is not to develop fundamentally new scenarios, but rather to specify 
scenarios that are reflective of the range of scenarios in the literature.  In contrast, for 
union formation and dissolution, there is no such projection literature to draw on and we 
develop our own assumptions based on alternative reasoning.  We also discuss the 
plausibility not only of the individual scenarios for each input assumption, but also of 
the particular combinations we use in formulating our large/young and small/old 
scenarios. 
TFR, Life Expectancy, and Net Migrants 
For TFR, life expectancy, and net migration assumptions, we calculate averages of the 
most recent projections made by well known institutions (Figs. 3, 4 and 5): the US 
Census Bureau (Hollmann et al. 2000; US Census Bureau 2004), the UN (UNPD 2004, 
2005), the World Bank (2004), IIASA (Lutz et al. 2001), and the US Social Security 
Advisory Board (2003). We group the projections into high, medium, and low scenarios 
as described by the publishing institutions, and average each group separately to obtain 
three scenarios that are reflective of the literature. We pursue this averaging procedure 
since it is conservative (as compared to selecting the most extreme projections available 
in the literature), representative of the literature in a way that does not favor any 
particular institution's projection, and also has some theoretical and empirical support 
(Sanderson, 1999).  Here, we only note non-obvious aspects of the selection of 
scenarios. 
For TFR, we use the updated medium projection from the USCB (2004), and the 
high and low scenarios from previous projections (1999; to date these projections have 
not been updated).  From the UN, we adopt the assumptions to 2050 from the most 
recent UN Population Prospects, and extend them by assuming they remain constant 
over the period 2050-2100.  We prefer these projections to the UN long range 
projections, which extend to 2300, because the latter have idiosyncrasies caused by the 
algorithm used to create fertility projections with pre-specified very long-term fertility 
levels.  From IIASA, we use the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the uncertainty 
distribution for TFR as our low, medium, and high scenarios. 
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Figure 3 U.S. TFR, Historical and Projected
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Sources for the historical data 1901-1999: Hauser, 1976; National Center for Health Statistics, 1974; 
Ventura et al., 2000, 2001; Martin et al., 2001, 2002. 
For life expectancy, the USCB projections are all from 1999 in this case, since 
the 2004 revision did not change previous life expectancy projections.  The UN only 
produces a single life expectancy projection, which we take from its long-range 
projection (UN, 2004).  From IIASA, we again use the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of 
the uncertainty distribution for the North America region. The difference between North 
America region and US is very small. For example, in year 2000, the life expectancy in 
North America is 74.2 for male and 80.7 for female, in contrast to 74.1 and 79.9 in the 
US.   
We add the projection of Sanderson and Scherbov (2004) in order to represent 
the possibility of relatively optimistic increases in life expectancy, an expectation of 
some researchers motivated by findings that the best-practice life expectancy has risen 
almost lineary from the 1850s to 2000 (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002).   Sanderson and 
Scherbov operationalize this finding in a probabilistic projection algorithm, producing 
projected life expectancies well above those of other institutions.  For example, the UN 
forecast is below the 0.025 fractile of their life expectancy distributions throughout the 
first half of the century, and by 2100 is just barely above it. Sanderson and Scherbov 
only provided their assumption of life expectancy for US female population. We 
estimate their implied life expectancy for US total population, using the proportionate 
differences of the life expectance between female and total population in North 
America. 
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Figure 4 U.S. Life Expectancy, Historical and Projected
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Sources for the historical data 1900-1999: Arias et al., 2003. 
 
For net migrants, we use only the projections of the USCB and the SSA.  
Projections from IIASA and the UN do not extend to 2100; in both cases projections are 
made up to the middle of the century, but thereafter mechanical assumptions are made 
that migration declines to zero in all scenarios. In our medium scenario we average 
USCB 2004 assumption and SSA assumption. In the low and high scenario, we average 
USCB 1999 assumptions and SSA assumption, since USCB 2004 projection only 
includes a medium assumption.  
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 Figure 5 U.S. Net Migration, Historical and Projected
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Source for the historical data 1880-1980: Unadjusted populations (U.S. Census Bureau, 1975, 1990); 
Births & Deaths 1870-1940 (Kuznets, 1958); Births & Deaths 1940-1980 (U.S. Census Bureau 1975, 
1990); Net Migrants 1790-1820 (Gemery, 1984; Curtin, 1969); Net Migrants 1820-1860 (McClelland and 
Zeckhauser, 1982).  
Source for the historical data 1980-1999: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000. 
Union Formation and dissolution 
The past two decades have witnessed a surge in research on marriage and cohabitation 
in the US. However, most studies are descriptive and focus on past experiences; we are 
not aware of any reasoned projections of these trends into the future.  Furthermore, 
quantitative studies tend to use crude rates as the measure of union formation and 
dissolution which do not reflect changes in the risk population. Since we use general 
rates in our projection, studies of trends in crude rates are not directly applicable. 
Owing to these limitations in data and literature, Zeng et al. (2005) assumed that 
union formation/dissolution will either increase or decrease 15% by 2020 and 25% by 
2050 in their scenarios. No justification for the plausibility of these trends was given; 
rather, the scenarios can be understood as a sensitivity analysis. Here, we develop a 
range of scenarios we consider plausible based on historical trends and analogy to 
experience in European countries.  Union formation consists of both marriage and 
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cohabitation, while union dissolution consists of both divorce and cohabitation 
dissolution.  It is difficult to consider trends in each of these rates individually, since 
they are closely linked to one another.  We therefore first briefly review literature and 
historical trends for the US and other (primarily European) countries for all these rates, 
and then describe the specification of assumptions for our scenarios. 
Marriage and cohabitation 
Over the past 50-100 years U.S. marriage rates have been generally high compared to 
many European countries and shared with them a substantial marriage boom after 
World War II (Figure 6). Following this boom, general marriage rates declined; in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden these rates have stabilized or slightly increased 
since the 1980s, while in the U.S. they have continued to decline.  Still, the general rate 
in the U.S. at the turn of the century was about 6.7%, whereas in these Nordic countries 
it was at or below 5%.  This comparison suggests that the U.S. rate could plausibly 
continue its decline. At the same time, an increase in the U.S. is also plausible. A study 
forecasting for the cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s concludes that marriage in the 
US will remain nearly universal for American women – close to 90 percent of women 
are predicted to marry. Moreover, forecasts by educational groups indicate that while in 
the past women with more education were less likely to marry, recent college graduates 
are forecasted to have the highest rate of eventual marrying despite their later entry into 
marriage (Goldstein and Kenney 2001). This implies that general marriage rates may 
increase in the future when the effect of postponing marriage for education vanishes.   
 
Figure 6 Comparison of general marriage rate
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Sources: For the US, we obtain the number of marriages prior to 1970 from National Center for Health 
Statistics (1995), and after 1970 from US Census Bureau (2003).Using PUMS data, we calculate risk 
population by marital status; using the number of marriages and population of non-married, we calculate 
the general marriage rate. For other countries, we obtain the number of marriages and population by 
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marital status, then calculate general marriage rates. Data is from Statistics Netherlands, Statistics 
Sweden, Statistics Norway, and Denmark Statistik. 
The past decline in the general marriage rate has been partially offset by a rise in 
non-marital cohabitation. Recent studies have improved the measurement of 
cohabitation and indicate a larger increase than previously thought (Baughman, Dickert-
Conlin and Houser 2002; Casper and Cohen 2000). According to an analysis of 1987-
1988 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) and 1995 National Survey 
of Family Growth (NSFG), the general cohabitation rate among women age 15-29 
increased from 2.1% in the early 1970s to 7.3% in the early 1990s, while the general 
marriage rate declined (Raley 2001). In 1995, the proportion of females who had 
entered cohabitation by age 25 reached about 45%.  Continued increase appears 
plausible, since this measure has been rising with no obvious peak yet reached across a 
wide range of countries (Figure 7). Some Scandinavian and Western European countries 
have substantially larger percentages of women entering cohabitation by age 25 as 
compared to the U.S., for example 75% in Sweden, 60% in France, and 58% in Norway 
and Austria (UNPD 2003b).  
 
Figure 7 Percentage of women had entered consensual union by birth cohorts
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Source: UN, 2003b. 
Examining the historical relationship between general marriage and cohabitation 
rates, the increase in the latter in the 1960s-1980s in the US has been almost as great as 
the decline in the former – with the result being that the total union formation rate has 
been relatively stable (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin 1991; 
Manning 1993, 1995). A number of more recent studies show that cohabitation 
continues largely to offset the decline in marriage, with a slight decrease in the total 
union formation rate (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Casper and Bianchi 2002; Heuveline and 
Timeberlake 2004; Toulemon 1997).  For example, while the proportion married by age 
25 declined from 71 to 52 per cent between 1977 and 1992, there was much less change 
over these cohorts (from 78 to 70 per cent) in the proportion of women who had lived in 
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a union. This means that more than 60% of the reduction of the union formation due to 
declining marriage rate was offset by an increasing cohabitation rate.  
Whether these trends will continue to offset each other in the future is unclear.  
The compensating effect of cohabitation has been weakening over time. More broadly, 
there has been considerable debate over the relationships between cohabitation and 
marriage (Bianchi and Casper 2000; Brown and Booth 1996; Bumpass et al. 1991; 
Clarkberg, Stolzenberg and Waite 1995; Manning 1993, 1995; Rindfuss and 
VandeHeuvel 1990; Thornton 1989). Some argue that cohabitation is typically a prelude 
to marriage, while others maintain that cohabitation is an alternative or substitution to 
marriage. In Scandinavian countries and some Western European countries, 
cohabitation has become more a substitution given that an increasing number of 
cohabitors remain in consensual unions without marrying. In contrast, studies of the 
marital status transition in the US indicate that cohabiting unmarried people have a 
much higher propensity of marriage than do non-cohabiting unmarried people. In a 
1987-1988 survey, 46 percent of cohabitors characterized their living arrangement as a 
precursor to marriage, while another 15 percent classified the arrangement as a trial 
marriage and 10 percent as a substitute for marriage. About 40 percent of all unmarried 
couples in this survey were married within five to seven years. More than 50% of 
couples who characterized their living arrangement as a precursor did marry within five 
to seven years, compared to 25% of unmarried couples in “trial marriage” or “substitute 
marriage” (Casper and Sayer 2000).   
Thus, there is historical experience in the U.S. of much more stable unions than 
currently exist – higher marriage rates and lower divorce rates.  European countries 
provide many examples of societies with substantially lower marriage rates and higher 
cohabitation rates than currently observed in the U.S. And finally, based on 
international experience, a range of possible relationships exist between marriage and 
cohabitation, including cohabitation as either a precursor to marriage (in which case 
changes in marriage and cohabitation rates would move in similar directions) or a 
substitute for marriage (in which case marriage and cohabitation rates would be more 
independent, or even anti-correlated).  
Divorce and cohabitation dissolution 
Measured as a crude rate, the U.S. divorce rate has been approximately double the rate 
for many Western European countries (Ahlburg and De Vita, 1992), and witnessed a 
substantial increase up to about 1980, and a decline thereafter (Figure 8).  However, 
measured as a general rate (which accounts for the population at risk, i.e., married), 
recent U.S. divorce rates are not much different from those of Western Europe, and has 
recently been stable or even declining. The leveling off of divorce in the U.S. appears to 
be real even considering the effect of increasing cohabitation, and taking into account 
other compositional factors (Goldstein 1999). At the same time, rates in Europe 
continue to increase, and the general divorce rate of Sweden has recently even become 
higher than that of the US.  Given trends in Europe, it is not implausible that the US 
general divorce rate could increase in the future. However, it is also possible that 
divorce will continue to decrease, with recent trends signaling a fundamental change in 
marriage patterns.  
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 Figure 8a Comparison of crude divorce rate (per 1000 population)
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Figure 8b Comparison of general divorce rate
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Source: same as in Figure 6 
Turning to cohabitation dissolution rates, our calculations indicate that the 
general rate is currently 38% in the U.S., significantly higher than the general divorce 
rate. Comparison to past trends for cohorts in low fertility countries (Figure 9) shows 
that the general cohabitation dissolution rate has become stable in East European 
countries and some other part of Europe, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
Italy, at levels that are both higher and lower than the U.S. rate (note that women of 
cohort 1965-1970 were still too young to complete union formation process, so these 
estimates are less reliable than for earlier cohorts) 
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Figure 9 Estimated general cohabitation dissolution rate
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Source: Same as in Figure 6. 
Considering the joint effect of divorce and cohabitation dissolution shows that 
there has been a substantial increase in the instability of unions in the U.S. (increasing 
from 30 to 38% dissolution over ten years) despite the plateau in the US divorce rate of 
the last two decades. This decreasing stability results from a decline in the proportion of 
cohabiters who marry their cohabiting partner (from 60 to 53 percent over this period). 
Similarly, unions begun by cohabitation have become less stable: ignoring whether or 
not the couple married, the proportion of cohabitators who had separated by one year 
increased from 45% to 54%. (Bumpass et al. 2000). Data from Sweden (Bennett, Blanc, 
and Bloom, 1988) and Canada (Balakrishnan et al., 1987) also suggest that marriages 
preceded by cohabitation are more, rather than less, likely to end in divorce.   
Future scenarios 
Using historical trends in union formation and dissolution as a basis for future scenarios 
is difficult. The extent to which cohabitation will become a substitute for marriage or 
will be a new form of courtship is uncertain, and our understanding of the factors which 
lead individual couples today to cohabit, marry, or to live apart is incomplete. 
Nonetheless, history and experience in other countries gives us some guide to plausible 
trends toward more (or less) pervasive, and more (or less) stable unions in the future.   
We define one scenario in which union formation is common and unions are 
stable; that is, high general union formation rates and low general union dissolution 
rates. This defines one end of a range of possible outcomes that would lead in general to 
larger households.  Specifically, we assume by 2050, the general marriage rate will 
double from 6.7% in 2000, returning to its highest historical value which occurred 
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around 1950.  At the same time, we assume the general cohabitation rate will increase 
by 50%, from 12.3% in 2000 to 18.5%, about the current level in Sweden. Cohabitation 
in this scenario serves more as a precursor to than a substitute for marriage. We assume 
the general divorce rate will decrease from 3.2% in 2000 to 1.5% in 2050, about the 
level in 1950.  We do not assume a decline in the cohabitation dissolution rate as well, 
but rather keep it constant, judging a decline to be less plausible in a scenario in which 
cohabitation is a pre-cursor to marriage (dissolution includes the transition to marriage).  
After 2050, all the union formation and dissolution rate are assumed to be constant. 
We define a second scenario in which union formation is less common and 
unions are unstable; that is, low general union formation rates and high general union 
dissolution rates, leading to smaller household sizes. Specifically, we assume that by 
2050 the general marriage rate will drop from 6.7% in 2000 to 3% in 2005, about the 
current level in Sweden, while the general cohabitation rate remains constant.  In this 
scenario, cohabitation acts more as a substitute to marriage. We assume that the general 
divorce rate increases from 3.2% in 2000 to 4%, close to its highest level in 1980, while 
the general cohabitation dissolution rate will increase from 38% in 2000 to 48%, close 
to the current Swedish level. After 2050, all the rates are assumed to be constant. 
US household projection 
Based on the analysis of future perspectives on TFR, life expectancy at birth, net 
migration, and union formation and dissolution, we construct a set of scenarios for the 
US: a mid-range projection and two projections intended to span a wide range of 
plausible outcomes in composition by household age and household size. Table 1 
summarizes the input assumptions defined in the previous section. 
 
Table 1: Summary of input assumptions for U.S. household projections 
 Small/Old Medium Large/Young
TFR (2100) 1.5 2.0 2.5 
Life Expectancy (2100) 103 yrs 91 yrs 83 yrs 
Migration (2100) 0.7 mill. 1.3 mill. 2.7 mill. 
Marriage (2050) -55% to level of Sweden constant Double to 1950 level
Cohabitation (2050) constant constant +50% to level of Sweden
Divorce (2050) +25% to 1980 level constant -50% to 1950 level
Cohabitation dissolution (2050) +25% to level of Sweden constant constant 
 
In our medium scenario, we adopt the medium scenarios for TFR, life 
expectancy at birth, and net migration derived from averaging the medium projections 
from major institutions. We assume constant levels for general union formation and 
dissolution rates and for other demographic parameters. 
In the large and young scenario, we combine high TFR, low life expectancy, and 
high migration with the assumption of stable unions: high general union formation rates 
and low general union dissolution rates, as derived in section 4.  This combination of 
assumptions is internally consistent given that fertility is higher within unions and 
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among recent migrants. In the small and old scenario, we combine low TFR, high life 
expectancy, and low migration with low general union formation rates and high general 
union dissolution rates. The detailed values of the three scenarios are included in 
Appendix Table 2a-2c.              
Results indicate that US population size and number of household will continue 
to grow under all the three scenarios (Figure 10). Population grows from 280 million at 
the start of the century to 390-980 million by 2100 – a factor of 2.6 uncertainty range.  
The number of households grows from 100 million to 190-310 million, a substantially 
smaller uncertainty range.  In fact, through 2050 there is almost no uncertainty at all.  
However, this does not reflect the full range of uncertainty because the scenarios were 
designed to span a wide range of age and size compositions, a decision which has the 
effect of narrowing the range of numbers of households.   
Average household size changes from 2.6 at the beginning of the century to 2.0-
3.1 by 2100 (with most of the change occurring by 2050). In all scenarios average 
household size decreases over at least the first several decades, due mainly to the 
momentum in population age structure and family formation and dissolution, as 
discussed in the previous section.  To test the difference in outcomes between a 
ProFamy projection and a vastly simpler headship rate approach, we combined our 
scenario outcomes for population age structure with age-specific household headship 
rates held constant at their levels in 2000 (figure 11).  Differences in the projected 
number of households are generally only a few percent, except in the large/young 
scenario in which they reach 10% by the end of the century (differences in average 
household size are slightly smaller).  
 
Figure 10 US historical and projected population, household and
household size
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and Economic Supplements, 2004 and earlier. http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/hh4.xls
 
 
 
Figure 11 Differences in number of household between ProFamy projection
and projection using headship rate model
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While this might be considered an approximation that is worth the reduction in 
complexity of the projection, the real advantage of carrying out a ProFamy projection is 
in the more disaggregated results for particular household types, which are not available 
from a simple headship rate projection.  Results indicate, for example, that changes in 
average household size are driven primarily by a tradeoff between the proportions living 
in households of size 4+ and those living in households of size 1 and 2.  There is little 
change in the proportion living in size 3 (Figure 12).  Under the small-old scenario, the 
proportion of population living in 1-person households will more than double, and in 2-
person households will increase by 50% in 2040 (then decline slightly afterwards).  At 
the same time, the proportion living in 4+-person households will decrease by about 
one-third. Conversely, under the large-young scenario, the proportion of population 
living in 1- and 2-person households will be halved and decrease by about 15%, 
respectively, while the share in the 4+-person household will increase by one-third.       
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 Figure 12 Proportion of population of households by size
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We also analyze changes in the proportion of population living in households 
headed by different age groups. In all scenarios there is little change in the proportion 
living in households headed by the middle aged, while elderly households gain, and 
young households decline, as a share of the population (Figure 13). This shift occurs to 
roughly equal degree across scenarios over the first 30 years (due to momentum), with 
the proportion living in elderly households doubling from 11% to 20% or more.  This 
proportion continues to rise to nearly 40% by 2100 in the small/old scenario, while it 
remains essentially constant in the large/young scenario. 
These results differ from the age structure of the population.  For example, the 
population age 45-64 accounts for 18-20% of the total population in these scenarios by 
2100, while the population living in households headed by 45-64 year olds accounts for 
25-28%.  Differences are smaller for the 65+ category (17-37% for the population, and 
20-39% for population by household age) and the <45 category (29-39% for the 
population, and 35-52% for population by household age).      
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 Figure 13 Proportion of population living in the households by age of the head
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Discussion and conclusions 
In our analysis, using the dynamic household projection model ProFamy, we assess the 
sensitivity of future living arrangements to various demographic events and develop a 
range of scenarios for composition of the population by household age structure and 
size.  Our sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the most important determinants of 
household size composition of the population are fertility and union formation and 
dissolution rates.  While the effect of other factors is small, we find some non-obvious 
results.  For example, delayed childbearing interacts with the age structure of the 
population to produce first an increase in average household size, and later a decrease.  
In addition, we find that increased life expectancy acts in the direction of smaller 
households, which is not obvious a priori given the expectation of a decline in single 
person elderly households when mortality is reduced.   
We assess the outlook for future changes in households by developing three 
scenarios aimed at exploring a wide range of outcomes for household size and age.  
These scenarios are based on new scenarios for fertility, life expectancy, and migration 
derived by averaging across existing scenarios in the literature, an approach that has 
been suggested (Sanderson, 1999) but that has not previously been used in long-term 
projections.  We also produce the first long-term scenarios for household formation and 
dissolution rates that go beyond mechanical assumptions and are based on reasoning 
grounded in past trends, experience in other countries, and current theoretical 
perspectives.  We anticipate that marriage rates could plausibly double, or decline by 
half; cohabitation rates could double; and divorce rates could increase by 25% or 
decline by half. 
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Results indicate that average household size declines over the next few decades 
in all scenarios, due mainly to changes in population age structure, and secondarily to 
momentum in household formation and dissolution processes.  By the second half of the 
century, the range of plausible household size outcomes is 2.0 to 3.1, with this result 
being driven by tradeoffs in the proportion of the population living in one and two 
person households, on the one hand, and households of size 4+, on the other.  The 
proportion living in households headed by the elderly (65+) doubles in the youngest 
scenarios, and nearly quadruples in the oldest scenario, to 40% of the population.  
Conversely, the proportion living in households headed by the young (<45) declines by 
nearly half, from 60% to 35%. 
Taken together, these results give a first look at the range of plausible outcomes 
for living arrangements over the next 50-100 years.  We have been relatively 
conservative in defining our high and low scenarios, by not choosing the most extreme 
scenarios in the literature for the components of population change, and by grounding 
our scenarios for union formation and dissolution rates in past experience in the U.S. 
and other countries.  In this way, we argue that the range of outcomes presented here is 
a minimum plausible range of uncertainty.  It is possible that unprecedented rates of 
demographic events could be experienced in the future, in which case this range would 
be expanded even further.   
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Appendix: 
Table 1 (continued on next page). Sensitivity of the population composition by 
household type to demographic events (% of total population). 
  
one 
person 
one 
couple 
couple 
with child 
single 
parent 
with child 
three 
generation 
2000 25.8 26.8 31.7 8.5 3.5 
2030 28.6 28.8 26.4 10.2 1.2 
2050 28.4 27.3 27.0 10.9 1.4 
Constant 
2100 24.4 26.9 30.0 11.6 1.8 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -1.0 2.0 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 
2050 -1.6 3.8 -1.0 -0.9 0.0 
LE+25% 
2100 -1.6 3.6 -0.6 -1.0 0.1 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.5 -1.6 1.5 0.5 0.1 
2050 -1.3 -3.5 3.4 1.4 0.3 
TFR+25% 
2100 -3.4 -6.7 6.9 3.4 0.5 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.9 -3.1 2.9 0.9 0.2 
2050 -1.5 -3.7 4.0 1.2 0.2 
NM+25% 
2100 -0.8 -2.6 2.8 0.9 0.1 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -2.6 2.7 1.7 -1.3 -0.1 
2050 -5.1 5.4 3.1 -2.2 -0.2 
UF+25% & UD-
25% 
2100 -6.4 7.5 3.7 -2.8 -0.5 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -1.7 1.8 0.9 -0.8 -0.1 
2050 -3.3 3.7 1.7 -1.4 -0.2 
GM&CR+25% 
2100 -4.3 5.4 1.9 -1.8 -0.5 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.5 0.0 
2050 -1.9 1.7 1.5 -1.0 0.0 
GD&CDR-25% 
2100 -2.6 2.5 2.1 -1.4 0.0 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.5 -0.8 1.2 0.9 -0.7 
2050 -0.3 -1.3 1.3 1.2 -0.9 
M&Bage+25% 
2100 0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.9 -1.3 
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one 
person 
one 
couple 
couple 
with child 
single 
parent 
with child 
three 
generation 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.1 0.9 -1.1 0.5 -0.2 
2050 -0.3 1.4 -2.4 1.5 -0.2 
Mage+25% 
2100 -0.5 1.7 -2.8 2.1 -0.4 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.6 -1.7 2.0 0.9 -0.5 
2050 -0.8 -2.4 2.6 1.5 -0.7 
Bage+25% 
2100 0.1 -1.3 1.2 1.1 -1.0 
2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2030 -0.6 -1.2 1.3 0.6 0.1 
2050 -1.1 -1.7 1.8 1.2 0.1 
LWC+25% 
2100 -1.1 -2.1 2.2 1.1 0.2 
 
Table 2a. Medium scenarios for US household projection 
 TFR LE NM GMR GCR GDR GCDR 
2000 2.03  76.8 1110218 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2005 2.03  78.0 1079723 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2010 2.02  78.8 1015892 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2015 2.00  79.6 1041495 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2020 2.00  80.4 1065476 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2025 1.99  81.2 1161428 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2030 1.99  81.9 1249481 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2035 1.99  82.6 1248439 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2040 1.99  83.2 1251699 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2045 1.99  83.9 1257617 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2050 1.99  84.5 1265059 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2055 1.99  85.2 1268905 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2060 2.00  85.9 1273475 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2065 2.00  86.5 1278413 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2070 2.00  87.3 1283659 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2075 2.01  87.9 1289325 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2080 2.01  88.5 1295321 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2085 2.01  89.1 1301590 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2090 2.01  89.8 1308251 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2095 2.01  90.4 1315133 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2100 2.01  90.8 1322396 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
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 Table 2b. Small household size and old age structure scenario for US household 
projection. 
 TFR LE NM GMR GCR GDR GCDR 
2000 2.00 76.9 935069 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.38 
2005 1.83 78.3 777587 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.39 
2010 1.75 79.7 692334 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.40 
2015 1.67 81.2 681905 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.41 
2020 1.61 82.6 676296 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.42 
2025 1.59 84.0 707074 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.43 
2030 1.57 85.2 732446 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.44 
2035 1.57 86.4 717331 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.45 
2040 1.57 87.7 708322 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.46 
2045 1.57 89.1 702724 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.47 
2050 1.57 90.4 698602 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2055 1.57 91.8 695466 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2060 1.56 93.0 692651 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2065 1.56 94.6 689804 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2070 1.56 95.7 686816 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2075 1.56 97.4 683906 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2080 1.56 98.6 681180 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2085 1.56 100.1 678498 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2090 1.55 101.5 676080 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2095 1.55 102.5 673772 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
2100 1.55 103.5 671704 0.03 0.123 0.04 0.48 
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Table 2c. Large household size and young age structure scenario for US household 
projection. 
 
 TFR LE NM GMR GCR GDR GCDR 
2000 2.02 76.47 1316348 0.07 0.12 0.03  0.38 
2005 2.2 76.99 1494753 0.07 0.13 0.03  0.38 
2010 2.28 77.54 1491751 0.08 0.14 0.03  0.38 
2015 2.32 78.05 1601934 0.09 0.14 0.03  0.38 
2020 2.35 78.64 1697708 0.10 0.15 0.03  0.38 
2025 2.36 79.17 1936451 0.10 0.15 0.02  0.38 
2030 2.37 79.56 2169402 0.11 0.16 0.02  0.38 
2035 2.38 79.81 2214463 0.12 0.17 0.02  0.38 
2040 2.37 80.16 2258698 0.13 0.17 0.02  0.38 
2045 2.38 80.36 2301723 0.13 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2050 2.39 80.78 2343678 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2055 2.4 80.98 2386430 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2060 2.41 81.27 2428252 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2065 2.42 81.52 2469008 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2070 2.42 82.01 2508931 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2075 2.43 82.15 2548442 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2080 2.44 82.27 2587483 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2085 2.44 82.42 2626136 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2090 2.44 82.67 2664467 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2095 2.44 82.68 2702588 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
2100 2.44 82.72 2740520 0.14 0.18 0.02  0.38 
 
Note: 
1. General rate is defined as the proportion of the events to the total number of persons 
at risk. For example, general cohabitation rate is the total number of new cohabitants 
divided by the number of non-cohabited never married, widowed and divorced people 
in the previous year. 
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